International Lawyer
Volume 26

Number 3

Article 6

1992

Swiss Statutes Concerning Money Laundering
Franco Taisch

Recommended Citation
Franco Taisch, Swiss Statutes Concerning Money Laundering, 26 INT'L L. 695 (1992)
https://scholar.smu.edu/til/vol26/iss3/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted
for inclusion in International Lawyer by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please
visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

FRANCO TAISCH*

Swiss Statutes Concerning
Money Laundering
On August 1, 1990, two new money laundering provisions supplementing the
Swiss Penal Code' came into force after having been adopted by the Swiss
Federal Parliament on March 23, 1990. One provision specifies the statutory
other provision deals with the lack of due
definition of money laundering; 2 the
3
diligence in financial transactions.
In recent years public concern over international organized crime, particularly
drug trafficking, has grown rapidly. Direct repression proved to be difficult. It
appears, however, that criminal organizations are most vulnerable in the financing of their drug-related activities and, in particular, in the recycling of illegal
profits flowing from their drug-related activities. Thus, the law has developed
means against money laundering. The world's seven industrial countries-the
G-7 countries-have created an international task force (the Financial Action
*Attorney at Law, admitted to all Swiss bars; Foreign Associate with Chadbourne & Parke, New
York, New York; Associate with Walder Wyss & Partners, Zurich, Switzerland; Dr. iur., University
of Zurich Law School.
1. Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch, Code P6nal Suisse, Codice Penale Svizzero [StGB], Systematic Official Journal, Systematische Sammlung des Bundesrechts [hereinafter SR] 311.0.
2. Id. art. 305 bis. The provision states (translation by the author):
Money Laundering
1. Any person carrying out an act appropriate to prevent the investigation of the origin, the discovery, or the
confiscation of assets that, as he knows or must assume, result from a crime shall be punished by imprisonment
or fine.
2. In severe cases, the punishment shall be penal servitude for up to five years or imprisonment. A fine amounting
up to SF I million shall be combined with the sentence of imprisonment or penal servitude, respectively. A case
is severe, particularly if the perpetrator:
a. acts as a member of a criminal organization;
b. acts as a member of a gang, formed with the purpose of continued money laundering;
c. obtains a high turnover or makes considerable profits from professional money laundering.
3. The perpetrator shall also be punished if the principal offense has been committed abroad and is punishable as
well in the country where the act has been perpetrated.

3. Id. art. 305 ter. The provision states (translation by the author):
Lack of Due Diligence in
Financial Transactions
Any person who professionally accepts, keeps on deposit, manages, or transfers assets belonging to a third party,
and fails to establish with all due diligence the identity of the beneficial owner, shall be punished by imprisonment
up to one year, detention, or fine.
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Task Force on Money Laundering, or the FATF) to fight against international
money laundering. Presently twenty-six countries are working in the FATF. The
Recommendation of the European Council 4 and the Principles of the Cooke
Committee 5 preceded the FATF and have been developed by it. 6 Furthermore,
the European Council developed a Convention, 7 already signed by fifteen countries, 8 and recently the European Community Council of Ministers adopted a
Directive 9 on money laundering issues. Thus, European Community Member
States have agreed to implement measures by January 1, 1993, to make the
laundering of proceeds from any criminal activity an offense under national law.
The Directive will impose obligations on credit financial institutions to obtain
confirmation of the identity of customers opening accounts or entering into
transactions with them. Where money laundering is suspected by the institution,
confidentiality obligations must be lifted and the relevant authorities informed.
Moreover, a UN Expert Group is discussing possibilities
to establish an en0
forceable UN Convention regarding money laundering.1
Although Switzerland had already criminalized certain acts of money laundering in connection with drugs pursuant to the Federal Narcotics Law,' it had
no general answer to organized crime. By the adoption of the new money
laundering provisions, Switzerland, as one of the important financial centers of
the world, has joined the international fight against organized crime. Moreover,
Switzerland, which is working in the FATF now, has signed the Convention of
the European Council. One year after the Swiss provision against money
laundering came into force, the need for supporting measures arose. Such
measures include the right of a person engaged in the financial business to
notify criminal authorities of suspicious observations despite banking secrecy
considerations; the extension of liability from natural persons to legal entities;
the criminality of criminal organizations; and facilitated confiscation. Today, the
Swiss money laundering laws are among the toughest yet against money laundering activities.
4. Recommendation no. R(80) 10, Measures against the transfer and the safekeeping of funds
of criminal origin, as of June 27, 1980, 28 EuR. Y.B. 319.
5. Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices: Statement of Principles
Concerning the Prevention of Criminal Use of the Banking System for the Purpose of Money
Laundering Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) $ 11,785 (Dec. 1988) [hereinafter Basle Statement].
6. Recommendation as of February 7, 1990, Bulletin of the Swiss Federal Banking Commission 20, 33.
7. Council of Europe: Convention on laundering, search, seizure and confiscation of the proceeds from crime, as of December 8, 1990, European Treaty Series no. 141 (December 1990).
8. Non-Member States are also invited to sign.
9. Council Directive 91/308 of 10 June 1991 Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for
the Purpose of Money Laundering 1991 O.J. (L 166) 77.
10. This group is the Intergovernmental Expert Group to Study the Economic and Social Consequences of Illicit Traffic in Drugs.
11. Betiubungsmittelgesetz, Loi Feddrale sur les Stupdfiants, Legge Federale sui Prodotti Stupefacenti [BetmG], SR 812.121.
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This article briefly describes the impact of the new provisions and proposed
supporting measures on the activities of an institution engaged in the financial
business. 12
I. International Aspects-Conflict of Laws
Generally, Swiss jurisdiction applies only to offenses perpetrated in the territory
of Switzerland. Thus, the criminal activity 13 or the criminal success 14 must have
taken place in Switzerland; otherwise Swiss penal law will not apply. Moreover,
Swiss penal law also applies if the offense is considered a crime punishable under
a principle of worldwide application of law. Although such a principle may apply
to prior drug-related crimes, mere money laundering and lack of due diligence in
financial transactions are not considered punishable under that principle.' 5 Furthermore, neither of the new money laundering provisions requires a criminal
effect, so the principle of place of effect of a criminal act is not applicable. 1 6 Thus,
prosecution depends only on the place of criminal activity.
Based on the foregoing, the activity with respect to lack of due diligence in
financial transactions 17 must have taken place in the territory of Switzerland.
However, a special sub-provision 8 of the statutory money laundering law also
permits prosecution by Swiss authorities in cases where the perpetrator has
committed the principal criminal offense not in the territory of Switzerland, but
abroad. The principal offense is understood to be the prior offense, that is, the
criminal offense prior to the actual money laundering activity. 19 Thus, any person carrying out an act in Switzerland designed to prevent the investigation of the
origin of assets, the discovery of assets, or the confiscation of assets, may be
prosecuted in Switzerland. The Swiss authorities may prosecute even if the
12. See generallyCHmSTOPH K. GRABER, GELDWASCHEREI (1990) [hereinafter GRABER); SCHWEI7ZEiuscHER ANwALTSVERBAND, GELDwAscHEREi
UND SORGFALTSPFL1CHT (articles by Paolo Berasconi, Peter Ulrich, Bruno Trinkler, Jirg Guggisberg, Daniel Zuberbihler, Werner de Capitani, and
Niklaus Schmid) (1991) [hereinafter SAV]; VORENTWURF UND ERLAuTERNDER BERIcHT, REVISION DES
STRAFGESETZBUCHES UND DES MILITnRSTAFGESET-zES BETREFFEND DIE STRAFBARKEIT DER
KRimaiELLEN ORGANISATION, DIE EINZIEHUNG, DAS MELDERECHT DES FINANCIERS SOWIE DIE VERANTWORTLICHKEIT DES UNTERNEHMENS (1991) [hereinafter VORENTWORF]; BOTSCHAFr OBER DIE
AENDERUNG DES SCHwE1zERIscHEN STRAFGESETZBUCHES, GESErZGEBUNG OBER GELDWASCHEREI UND

MANGELNDE SORGFALT BE GELDGESCHAFrEN, Federal Journal, Bundesblatt [B] 1989 1061 (June 12,
1989) [hereinafter BoTscRAr]; Gunther Arzt, Das schweizerische Geldwdschereiverbot im Lichte
amerikanischerErfahrungen, 106 SCHwEIzERIScHE ZErrSCHRIT FOR STRAFREcHT [ZStrR] 160 (1989);
Beat Messerli, Die Geldwascherei de lege lata etferenda, 105 ZStrR 418 (1988); PAoLO BERNASCONI, FiNANZUNTERWELT (1988) [hereinafter BERNASCONI].

13. StGB art. 3.
14. Id. art. 7.
15. See GRABER, supra note 12, at 164 n.288.
16. See Entscheidungen des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts, Amtliche Sammlung 105 IV 326

[BGE].
17. StGB art. 305 ter.

18. Id. art. 305 bis no. 3.
19. See GRABER, supra note 12, at 164-65.
FALL 1992
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criminal origin of the assets lies in an offense committed abroad, provided the
prior offense is punishable also in the country where it was perpetrated. On the
other hand, if the prior offense took place in Switzerland and the actual money
laundering activity was committed abroad, Swiss prosecution applies only to the
prior offense.
II. Statutory Definition of Money Laundering
A.

CRIMINAL CONDUCr

Any person carrying out an act designed to prevent the investigation of the
origin, the discovery, or the confiscation of assets that, as the person knows or
must assume, result from a crime risks punishment. In accordance with an
established principle of Swiss penal law, only a natural person may commit this
offense. Thus, an entity itself is not punishable, but the respective representatives and employees acting on behalf of such entity are punishable. The entity,
however, might be called to account by the competent administrative authority.
Consequently, the Swiss Ministry of Justice has recently proposed a draft law
20
establishing criminal liability of entities.
The offense must be designed to prevent the investigation of the origin, the
discovery, or the confiscation of assets. Whether the offense is an act within the
scope of one's profession is immaterial. The appropriateness need not be concrete; an abstract appropriateness suffices. 2 1 Thus, financial transactions of a
completely ordinary nature, such as the simple acceptance of funds on deposit so
as to open the way to the transfer of international funds, may constitute money
laundering activity in some cases. 22 Typical acts of prevention have yet to be
established in practice. So far, the Swiss Federal Banking Commission 23
advised
the banks recently to refrain from executing the following transactions:
" transfer orders to a foreign country and check transfers by customers not
maintaining permanent business relations with the bank;
* acceptance of money orders of other banks without disclosure of name and
account number of the beneficiary;
* use of "nostro-accounts" (bank's own accounts) or accounts of employees
to filter or to camouflage customer's transactions;
* keeping of accounts named with pseudonyms not identifiable as fictitious
names;
" acceptance and documentation of a security for a credit not corresponding
with the economic reality or acting as a fiduciary in the acceptance and
documentation of a credit with a fictive security;
20.
21.
22.
land, 8
23.

See infra part HI.A.
See GRABER, supra note 12, at 133 et seq.
See also Shelby R. du Pasquier & Dr. Andreas von Planta, Money Laundering in SwitzerINT'L Bus. LAw. 394, 395 (1990).
Circular Letter as of December 18, 1991, effective May 1, 1992.
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certification or (i) payment orders indicating incorrect customers, of (ii)
fictive cash withdrawals or of (iii) fictive deliveries of securities.
Only criminal investigations by public prosecutors are covered by the new
provisions; investigations by administrative authorities such as tax authorities
and the Swiss Federal Banking Commission, or evidentiary proceedings in civil
litigations, are not included.24
The offense of money laundering need not be an active conduct; it can also be
committed by omission. In particular, if a manager of a financial institution fails
to comply with his supervisory duty, and an employee commits an offense
considered as money laundering, the25manager may be punished also as committing money laundering by omission.
0

B.

OBJECr OF THE CRIME

The law mentions as the object of money laundering assets which result from
crime. Assets comprise all forms of economic interests and pecuniary advantages, that is, not only cash and currency, but also securities, claims, metals,
and precious stones, as well as all other kinds of movable property, even real
estate and real property rights. 26 Whether assets result from crime must be
interpreted narrowly with respect to the qualification of a prior act as a crime
and broadly with respect to the qualification of assets as a result of such prior
crime.27
It is understood that the tainted assets have their origin in an offense that Swiss
law considers to be a formal crime. The term "crime" according to Swiss penal
law only includes serious crimes and is technically defined as an offense punishable by penal servitude from one and up to twenty years. 2 s Consequently, not
every criminal origin of assets will qualify under Swiss Penal Code article 305
bis. In practice, proving such criminal origin of assets is difficult. 29 Furthermore,
tax offenses, even tax fraud, are qualified by federal law-and generally by
cantonal law, too-as misdemeanors and not as serious crimes. Therefore, Swiss
Penal Code article 305 bis does not apply in these cases, too.
24. See BorscHAFr, supra note 12, at 1084.
25. See GRABER, supra note 12, at 137-38. However, that is an issue that still remains highly
uncertain.
26. See BorscRiAFr, supra note 12, at 1082.
27. See id. at 1081 etseq.; see also GRABER,supra note 12, at 117. Petty offenses are excluded.

Thus, money laundering, except in serious cases, and lack of due diligence in financial transactions
are not considered crimes in the technical sense. Offenses which constitute "crimes" include:
Receipt of stolen property (StGB art. 133); Theft (StGB art. 137); Robbery (StGB art. 139);
Unfaithful management (StGB art. 140); Fraud (StGB art. 148); Extortion and blackmail (StGB art.
156); Usury (StGB art. 157); Fraudulent bankruptcy (StGB art. 163); Unlawful imprisonment and
kidnapping (StGB arts. 183 & 184); Acceptance of bribes by public officials (StGB art. 315); as well
as some serious violations of the Federal Narcotics Law (BetmG art. 19).
28. See StGB art. 35, art. 9, para. 1. Penal servitude and simple imprisonment without hard
labor are only technically different. Today, there is no actual hard labor.
29. See GRABER, supra note 12, at 129-30.
FALL 1992

700

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

Some uncertainty remains with respect to assets that are neither the direct
result nor the product, but are otherwise related to a crime. The principle of
broad interpretation in that respect appears not to limit the application of Swiss
Penal Code article 305 bis to the immediate results or products of a crime. Thus,
assets need not directly originate in crime; even substitute assets are considered
as resulting from crime if they replace assets that result directly from crime. 3 °
The purpose of such a broad interpretation, however, is to include all possible
unclean assets. 31 Thus, assets considered clean, but still related in some other
way to a crime probably are excluded. 32 The courts have not yet decided this
question.
C.

INTENT

The new Swiss provisions on money laundering presuppose that the perpetrator knows or must assume that the assets result from a crime. This means that
33
there is no criminal liability for negligence, or even for gross negligence,
although negligence may still trigger certain administrative consequences provided by the Swiss Federal Law on Banks and Savings Banks. 34 A person is
deemed to have acted intentionally if he acted recklessly, that is, if he could
foresee the criminal consequences of his conduct and has made allowances for
them. If the probability of the criminal result reaches a sufficiently high degree,
the conduct is deemed to be intentional. Thus, not every excuse destroys intent.
Even if the accused is unsure of where the assets came from, there is still a
criminal intent if he considers the possibility of a criminal origin but commits the
offense anyway (dolus eventualis). His general knowledge that the act is a
serious crime and not a petty offense is sufficient. No intent to enrich himself,
that is, to obtain a material advantage by unlawful means, is necessary.
D.

SEVERE CASES OF MONEY LAUNDERING

The following acts are considered as severe cases:
1. Acts by a Member of a Criminal Organization
In the meaning of the Swiss penal law an "organization" has to consist of at
least three members. Furthermore, the law presupposes that the organization
intends to act jointly for a long and undetermined period of time, and further that
its activities include serious crimes, namely crimes of violence. 35
30. See id.at 118 etseq.
31. See id. at 117.
32. See du Pasquier & von Planta, supra note 22, at 395.
33. See BoTscHAFr, supra note 12, at 1084.
34. Bundesgesetz diber Banken und Sparkassen, Loi F&1drale sur les Banques et les Caisses
d'Epargne, Lege Federale su le Banche e le Casse di Risparmio [BaG], SR 952.0.
35. See BoTscHAFr, supra note 12, at 1085.
VOL. 26, NO. 3
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2. Acts by a Member of a Gang Formedfor the
Purpose of ContinuedMoney Laundering
According to general case law, the term "gang" means two or more persons
acting jointly with the intent to commit several independent crimes that might not
yet be worked out in detail. 36
3. Acts Including High Values and
ProducingConsiderable Profit
This qualification, pursuant to general case law, includes repeated commission
It also includes readiness
of the crime with the intention of making an income.
37
to act criminally in an undefined number of cases.
As illustrated by the foregoing examples of serious cases, it is unlikely that
persons and institutions engaged in the financial business would risk being
charged with a serious case of money laundering if they were merely conducting
their regular course of business.
E.

PUNISHMENT

The basic punishment provided by the Swiss Penal Code article 305 bis is
imprisonment from three days and up to three years38 or a fine up to a maximum
of SF 40,000 (about U.S. $26,500). 39 Serious cases are punished by penal

servitude for up to five years 40 or by imprisonment from three days and up to
three years. Moreover, such imprisonment or penal servitude shall be imposed
with a fine not exceeding SF 1 million (about U.S. $660,000).
H. Lack of Due Diligence in
Financial Transactions
The basic statutory definition of money laundering is complemented by a
provision that has an even more vital impact on an institution engaged in the
financial business: lack of due diligence in financial transactions.
A.

PERPETRATOR

A possible perpetrator must be engaged in the business of professionally
accepting, keeping on deposit, or managing or transferring assets belonging to
third parties. An activity is considered professional if it is not limited to an
individual case, but produces a regular source of income. This source of income
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

See BGE 100 IV 220, 105 IV 181.
See id. 98 IV 419, 99 IV 488, 107 IV 482.
StGB art. 36.
StGB art. 48, no. 1, para. 1.
See supra note 28.
FALL 1992
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needs not be the exclusive source, but must
represent more than an unimportant
4
contribution to the perpetrator's living. 1
The activities mentioned, that is, "accepts, keeps on deposit, manages, or
transfers," are not an ultimate enumeration, but a list of examples of typical
transactions in the financial sector. Thus, a perpetrator could be engaged in any
financial business. Swiss Penal Code article 305 ter targets not only representatives or employees of banks or bank-like institutions and other financial institutions, but also trustees, investment consultants, assets managers, money
changers, jewelry dealers, and lawyers engaged in the financial sector.42
Pursuant to the aforementioned principle of Swiss penal law,4 3 a company is
not normally punishable, only the respective representatives or employees who
act on behalf of such entity. Thus, there is no penal responsibility of an entity.
Such entity, however, might be called to account by the competent administrative
authority if it notes repeated infractions. In the banking sector the Swiss Federal
Banking Commission may withdraw a banking license. However, in the nonbank
sector (in particular, trust and auditing companies) the law does not provide for
such an action. 44 Aware of that fact, the Swiss Ministry of Justice has recently
proposed a draft law that makes companies themselves criminally liable. The
proposal is expected to come before the Sw iss Federal Parliament in the near
future.
Criminal liability of legal entities has a long tradition in Anglo-American
countries, and during the last ten years it also has been adopted in several
Continental-European nations. Although Switzerland has incorporated the principle in administrative and fiscal law, the proposal would introduce it for the first
time into penal law. Already, the draft law has been strongly criticized.4 6
Under the proposal, an entity could become liable if a corporate body or
manager or a person acting in a de facto managerial position commits an offense
that is not considered only as a misdemeanor.47 The entity could even become
liable, due to the general principle of the liability of the principal, as if such a
person is liable because through omission he failed to prevent a crime committed
by a subordinate. However, an offense is attributed to the entity only if the crime
is related to its business; private offenses of a corporate body or a person acting
in a legal or de facto managerial position are excluded. 49
41. See BorscHAFr, supra note 12, at 1088.
42. E.g., a lawyer acting merely as a financial intermediary or as an investment manager while
not providing any legal services. BGE 112 Ib 608; see BOTSCHAFr, supra note 12, at 1088.
43. See supra part HI.A.
44. See GRABER, supra note 12, at 160-61.
45. See VoRENTwuRF, supra note 12, at 47 et seq.
46. See, e.g., Comment on the Draft Law by the Swiss Banker's Association to the Swiss Federal
Council (June 30, 1991).
47. See VoRENTwuRF, supra note 12, at 53-54.
48. See BGE 96 IV 174, 105 IV 176.
49. See VORENTWURF, supra note 12, at 54.
VOL. 26, NO. 3
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The entity is liable if there is evidence of a crime perpetrated by a legal body
or a person acting in a legal or de facto managerial position. This liability exists
even if it is impossible to determine the identity of the individual who committed
the offense or to attribute the violation of required due diligence to an individual
50
person.
The draft law targets entities of any kind, that is, not only corporations, but
any company, partnership, or52firm, as well as individual enterprises. 51
The proposal provides for:
* Obligation to make a payment up to SF 10 million (about U.S. $6,600,000).
Such an obligation is similar to a fine. However, contrary to a fine, the
amount of the payment is not determined by the degree of fault, but for the
purpose of preventing new crimes.
* Prohibition of business activities. Such a prohibition is confined to business
activities that are directly related to the offense. The prohibition may be
ordered for a limited as well as for an unlimited period of time. However,
the latter may be imposed only if a limited sanction has failed already. The
sentence can be suspended on probation between two and up to five years
and may be combined with directives.
* Dissolution of the entity. As a measure of last resort, the court may order
a dissolution in cases of serious or repeated violations, or both. A court may
order a dissolution even if the unlawful actions do not prevail over the
business of the entity. The court can suspend the sentence on probation
between two and up to five years and also may combine it with directives.
* Supervision. The judge may require that a public or private authority supervise the entity for a maximum of five years.
* Combination of several sanctions. The judge is entitled to combine the
above sanctions as far as practicable.
B.

CIRvUNAL CONDUCT

The person who professionally accepts, keeps on deposit, manages, or transfers assets belonging to third parties has to establish with all due diligence the
identity of the beneficial owner. The crime is considered as committed if such
person fails to establish the identity of the beneficiary; whether the assets are
indeed of criminal origin or thought to be legal or illegal is irrelevant. The duty
to identify the beneficial owner with due diligence is absolute (abstract, strictliability tort). 53 Identification of the direct counter party to the contract is insufficient. The identity of the beneficial owner must be established.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 54-55.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 55 et seq.
See BorrscHAFr, supra note 12, at 1089.
FALL 1992
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Until now, the term beneficial owner was unknown in Swiss penal law. The
notion is used, however, in other fields of Swiss law5 4 and corresponds to the
concept of beneficial owner in the United States and other Anglo-American
countries. Furthermore, the Swiss Federal Banking Commission stated several
years ago that banks must check the economic background of a deal under certain
conditions. 55 Also, the Agreement on Swiss Banks' Code of Conduct with
Regard to the Exercise of Due Diligence as of July 1, 1987, a purely private
agreement made under the auspices of the Swiss Banker's Association, uses the
term beneficial owner, but does not define it explicitly. 56 However, the interpretation of that term by the respective Supervising Commission points
in the same
57
direction, although it did not limit itself by a formal definition.
The reservation of "due diligence" is designed to allow for characteristics of
different professions. It calls for a reasonable identification of the beneficial
owner. 58 The notion of due diligence corresponds with the term used in the
CDB. 59
It is expected that, to some extent, the respective CDB provisions and the case
law of the supervising authorities will serve as a model with respect to due
6
diligence in ascertaining the identity of the beneficial owner. 0
Pursuant to the CDB, all due diligence that reasonably can be expected under
the circumstances is required. Banks and bank-like institutions may assume that
the contracting party is indeed the beneficial owner. However, if, due to unusual
circumstances, the institution has any doubt as to whether the contractual party
is the beneficial owner, the institution must take steps to establish the identity of
the beneficial owner. 61 The following situations demonstrate unusual circum62
stances, and therefore, should give rise to doubt:
" A power of attorney is conferred on someone who clearly would not have
sufficiently close links to the contracting party;
* The financial standing of someone wishing to carry out a transaction is
known to the bank, and the assets deposited or about to be deposited are
disproportionate to that person's financial standing;

54. E.g., company law, administrative law, tax law, and other fiscal laws, even if not explicitly
in the statutes.
55. A policy affirmed by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court in several cases. See, e.g., BGE 111
lb 127.
56. See The Agreement on Swiss Banks' Code of Conduct with Regard to the Exercise of Due
Diligence art. 3 (July 1, 1987) [hereinafter CDB].
57. However, in one case the Supervising Commission defined the "beneficial owner" as the
"real owner of the invested assets." 32 WIRTSCHAFT UND RECHT, ZEITSCHRIFr FOR WIRTSCHAFrsPOLrK UND WiRTSCHA~rsREcHT Mrr EINscHLuss DES SOZIAL UND ARBErrSRECHTS 291 (1980) [WuR].

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

See BOTSCHAFr, supra note 12, at 1089.
See CDB, supra note 56, art. 3, no. 18.
See BOTscHAFr, supra note 12, at 1089.
See, e.g., 40 WuR 172-73 (1988).
See CDB, supra note 56, art. 3, no. 18.
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A transaction is requested through correspondence by a person domiciled
abroad who submits an authenticated signature, but who is not personally
known to the bank;
" The course of the bank's relations with the customer give rise to doubt in
some other way.
However, the measure of due diligence has to be assessed in each individual
situation. Thus, under the confirmed case law of the Swiss Federal Banking
Commission, a clarification of the economic background is required if there are
indications that the transaction could be part of an immoral or unlawful deal, or
the transaction is complex, exceptional, or very substantial. 63
If the bank has any doubts when entering into a relationship with a customer,
it has to require by means of a special form64 a written statement of the contracting party, certifying that he is the beneficial owner or disclosing the name of
the beneficial owner. 65 This obligation refers to the opening of accounts and
securities accounts, entering into fiduciary transactions, renting of safe-deposit
boxes, and cash transactions involving amounts of more than SF 100,000 (about
U.S. $66,000).
If the contracting party is a person bound by professional secrecy, such as an
attorney at law or a notary, or if the contracting party is an enterprise and member
of the "Swiss Institute of Certified Accountants and Tax Consultants," such
customer must confirm on a special written form66 that he knows the beneficial
owner. The customer must also confirm that having displayed due diligence, he
is not aware of any fact that might indicate that the beneficiary is abusing the
rights to banking secrecy, or, in particular, that the assets concerned are the result
of any criminal activity. 67 There exists an important exception: if the counter
party is a bank or bank-like institution that has joined the CDB, a written
statement is not required. 68
In several cases the Supervising Commission has emphasized that a mere
formal check of the identity of the beneficial owner is not sufficient. Thus, if
serious doubt remains, the bank or bank-like institution must do more than
simply rely on the
formal confirmation of the contracting party that he is the
69
beneficial owner.
With respect to the CDB and the case law of the supervising authorities as a
model, three issues remain controversial and unresolved. First, it is unknown
whether the minimal limit of SF 100,000 (about U.S. $66,000) for a cash
transaction, which evokes the obligation to establish the identity of the contract"

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

See BGE 10011 15, 108 Ib 190, 111 lb 127.
Form A.
See CDB, supra note 56, arts. 2, 3.
Form B.
See CDB, supra note 56, art. 5, para. 2.
See Administrative Regulations Concerning CDB No. 42.
See, e.g., 32 WuR 290-91 (1980).
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ing party and disclosure of the beneficial owner pursuant to CDB, may be upheld
under Swiss Penal Code article 305 ter. Second, it is unknown whether disclosure of the beneficial owner must continue after a relationship has been established. Third, it is unknown whether the due diligence required by Swiss Penal
Code article 305 ter is duly observed when, in case of doubt with regard to the
beneficial owner, a person engaged in the financial business complies with the
formal requirements of the CDB provisions, but fails to make any additional
inquiry with respect to the identification of the beneficial owner.
To summarize the discussion, it appears that the fixing of a minimal amount to
evoke the obligation of establishing the identity of the contracting party and
disclosure of the beneficial owner might be in compliance with the due diligence
required by Swiss Penal Code article 305 ter. It must be remembered that this
provision targets organized crime and not transactions of small investors, and
that the legislative history refers on several occasions to the CDB as a model. 7 °
Although under the CDB the amount of SF 100,000 (about U.S. $66,000) in
cash transactions can be used as a guideline, some transactions of less than SF
100,000 might be considered transactions in which the identity of the beneficial
owner must be established as well. As long as the courts have not decided this
issue, there is no certainty.7 1 The financial institution or person engaged in the
financial business is advised to check the identity of the contracting party and to
require the disclosure of the beneficial owner by the contracting party in all
cases, exempting petty ones. Furthermore, the institution must carefully consider
the possibility of intentional smurfing, that is, the splitting of assets to avoid
identification. 72
According to the wording, the application of Swiss Penal Code article 305 ter
is not limited to the moment when the parties are establishing a relationship.
Although the CDB is primarily focused on this moment, 73 it also obliges banks
and bank-like institutions to sever account relationships if transactions give reason to suspect that the bank or bank-like institution was misled when verifying
the customer's identity. 74 There is no precedent in that respect. It appears reasonable, however, to repeat the verification of the identity of the beneficial owner
assumption that the identity given by the
if any observations lead to a legitimate
75
incorrect.
is
party
contracting
In accordance with the rulings of the Supervising Commission and the Swiss
Federal Banking Commission, if the contracting party formally confirms only
himself as the beneficial owner, this is insufficient in cases where (i) serious
70. See, e.g., BOTSCHArr, supra note 12, at 1089.
71. The discussion varies from SF 5,000 (about U.S. $3,300) to SF 100,000 (about U.S.
$66,000).
72. See also GRABER, supra note 12, at 201.
73. See CDB, supra note 56, art. 2.
74. See id. art. 9.
75. See de Capitani, in SAV, supra note 12, at 102-03.
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doubts exist with respect to the identity of the beneficial owner, or (ii) there are
indications that the transaction is part of an immoral or unlawful deal, or (iii) the
transaction appears as complex, exceptional, or important. 76 It remains
uncertain
77
whether the identity can be confirmed only by a written statement.
If the contracting party is a person bound by professional secrecy, however, it
might be insufficient simply to rely on his confirmation that he knows the beneficial owner and has displayed all due diligence. The question in that respect is
whether due diligence can be exercised by delegation. As far as the respective act
is in fact protected by professional secrecy, it appears that such a transfer and
reliance should be considered sufficient due diligence. 7 8 Otherwise, due diligence could only be displayed if the principle of professional secrecy were
completely diluted.
However, some professional acts, especially in the financial business, are not
protected by the principle of professional secrecy. In particular, this exception
derives from the ruling of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court that a lawyer acting
merely as an intermediary in financial matters or as an investment 79manager and
not providing legal services may not invoke professional secrecy.
The absence of any judicial precedent precludes certainty on this issue. However, considering that the wording of Swiss Penal Code article 305 ter no longer
allows the banks and bank-like institutions to rely on nonbanking third parties for
identifying the beneficial owner, the Swiss Federal Banking Commission has
recently ordered the existing Form B to be replaced by September 30, 1992, by
a written statement giving the identity of the beneficial owner.80 The Swiss Bar
Association, however, contests the legal authority of the Swiss Federal Banking
Commission to determine the reach of a lawyer's professional secrecy by interpretation of the new penal provision. For new accounts the new rule has been
applied since July 1, 1991. The existing exemption where the account holder is
itself a bank or bank-like institution interestingly continues to apply, however.
Thus, the CDB will have to be changed, but will remain in force until September 30, 1992.81
Furthermore, the Swiss Federal Banking Commission has set up a task force
that recently set forth guidelines on when and what inquiry must be undertaken
76. See 32 WuR 290-91 (1980); see also BGE 108 lb 190.
77. The Botschaft explicitly requires a written confirmation. See Bo'rscHAFr, supra note 12, at
1089. Furthermore, the Swiss Federal Banking Commission appears to advise a written statement by
the contracting party or a memorandum by the bank. See Circular Letter as of December 18, 1991,
effective May 1, 1992. However, there is a controversy as to what the consequences would be in a
situation where there is no written document. See GRABER, supra note 12, at 203.
78. See also du Pasquier & von Planta, supra note 22, at 395.
79. See BGE 112 Ib 608.
80. Circular Letter as of April 25, 1991, effective July 1, 1991. Only very restricted exemptions
apply to attorneys at law.
81. See Daniel Zuberbiihler, Etat des mesures applicablepar les banques suisse destindesd lutter
contre le blanchiment de capitaux, Conftrence de presse de la Commission Fddraledes banques du
9 avril 1991, at 7-8.
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by a bank or bank-like institution when establishing the identity, and assessing
the integrity, of a customer [hereinafter Guidelines].82 Generally, under these
Guidelines, a bank or bank-like institution is advised to start additional inquiries
(i) if a customer entering into a relationship with the institution opens an account
or a deposit by cash transaction or delivery of precious metal when these involve
amounts of more than SF 100,000 (about U.S. $66,000); (ii) if a customer
during the relationship with the institution completes unusually frequent or unusually extensive cash or precious metal transactions that do not correspond with
the customer's regular course of business; and (iii) if the institution recognizes
certain other circumstances that indicate money laundering activities. In an annex to the Guidelines, the Swiss Federal Banking Commission provided a comprehensive list of critical circumstances. Thus, additional inquiries are advised
if, among other possible situations, (i) the economic purpose of a transaction is
not perceptible, (ii) a customer withdraws funds without any perceptible reason
shortly after having deposited them, (iii) an inactive account becomes extensively active without any perceptible reason, (iv) a customer provides the institution with incorrect information, or (v) it is inconceivable why the customer has
chosen the institution for his business.
The duty of additional inquiry is satisfied by the obtaining of all information
necessary to assess sufficiently the background of a transaction. In this connection, the Guidelines refer to a broad discretion of the institution but emphasize
the (i) purpose and type of a transaction, (ii) financial status respectively of the
contracting party and the beneficial owner, (iii) occupations of the contracting
party and of the beneficial owner, respectively, and (iv) origin of the funds. The
institutions may inquire with the contracting party or obtain the information by
some other way, for example, by inquiring with third parties. In any event, the
furnished information must be checked with respect to its feasibility. These
Guidelines provide a helpful tool for making banks and bank-like institutions
deal sensibly with the new penal provision. However, guidelines are not final
checklists; every case is different and money laundering activities will change
their appearance as they develop.
Another issue remains: are banks and bank-like institutions to be expected to
act as detectives for criminal prosecution authorities? Subliminally, the CDB and
the new provision could give that impression, but the legislative history does not
confirm it. Money laundering provisions are based on the need for functional
protection of the financial system; banks assuming the role of informers would
jeopardize their capability to function. Legislative history emphasizes a reasonable inquiry8 3 to allow for characteristics of different professions and not to
jeopardize the capability of the financial system to function. Hence, the functional protection calls for an inquiry, but limits at the same time its required
82. Circular Letter as of December 18, 1991, effective May 1, 1992.
83. See BOTSCHAFr, supra note 12, at 1089; cf. Arzt, supra note 12, at 195.
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scope. The Guidelines try to outline this scope with respect to banks and banklike institutions. Guidelines focused on other professions may follow as well.
C.

INTENT

Swiss Penal Code article 305 ter applies to offenses committed with intent.
Obviously, the crime of lack of due diligence contains an element of negligence.
Swiss Penal Code article 305 ter combines intent and negligence by dealing with
"quasi-negligence."84
Quasi-negligence is understood as the intentional violation of due diligence.
The person concerned is aware of the actual conditions invoking the obligation
to establish the identity of the beneficial owner and knows that he should act
accordingly. 85 Even if someone is unsure that he is obliged to clarify the actual
situation, criminal intent can still be found if he is acting recklessly (dolus
eventualis), that is, if he considers such a duty a possibility and nonetheless does
not clarify.
Differentiating in practice between intentional violation of due diligence, that
is, punishable quasi-negligence, and negligent violation of due diligence, that is,
not punishable negligence, might cause problems. A degree of uncertainty remains, which the courts will have to resolve.
D.

PuNisHmENr

The punishment provided by Swiss Penal Code article 305 ter is imprisonment
up to one year, detention up to three months,86 or a fine up to SF 40,00087 (about
U.S. $26,500). An offense of Swiss Penal Code article 305 ter is considered to
be of a lesser degree than actual money laundering. Article 305 ter is an omnibus
clause focused on the same object of legal protection as article 305 bis.88 If a
person commits both crimes, set out in Swiss Penal Code articles 305 bis and ter,
he will be punished only under Swiss Penal Code article 305 bis. 89
IV. Refraining from Executing any Transaction
If the identification of the beneficiary leads to the assumption that the origin of
the assets is criminal, or if afterwards it appears that the client may be using any
services for receiving, managing, or channeling funds of a criminal origin, then
the financial institution concerned and its representatives and employees will do
better to refrain from executing or taking part in any transaction. Otherwise the
84. See BorrsctAFr, supra note 12, at 1088; GRABER, supra note 12, at 264.
85. See GRABER, supra note 12, at 205.

86.
87.
88.
89.

StGB art. 39, no. 1.
StGB art. 48, no. 1, para. 1.
See BorscHAFr, supra note 12, at 1090.
See id. at 1090.
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financial institution or its representatives and employees may be considered to9 be
engaged also in money laundering under Swiss Penal Code article 305 bis. 0
If circumstances lead to an assumption of illegality at a time when a relationship between a financial institution and its customers has yet to be established,
the institution should refrain from establishing a relationship. The institution may
even notify the competent criminal prosecution authority without compromising
professional secrecy. 9 1
The situation becomes more critical if the illegality becomes apparent after a
relationship has been established but prior to any assumption of illegality. The
CDB requires that signatory banks and bank-like institutions explicitly sever
their relationships with their customers, as far as possible without violating
the contract with the client, if transactions give reason to suspect that the bank
or bank-like institution was misled when verifying the identity of the beneficial owner.92 The Cooke Committee, in its Statement of Principles,9 3 advises
banks to take all appropriate steps within the law, including refusing all assistance, severing existing relationships with the customer concerned, or blocking
accounts.
However, what are the concrete consequences of such appropriate steps, or of
severing the relationship, and when does a possible reaction that is within the law
also not violate the contract with the client? The Swiss Federal Banking Commission appears to advise the severing of the relationship if a paper trail of the
funds is maintained and appears to support the notification of the competent
criminal prosecution authority. 94 However, it concedes that there is no certainty
in that respect; the situation can create serious difficulties for the institution
concerned.
The following is a brief analysis of the three main possible reactions and the
resulting dilemma in such situations:
1. Severing All Relations
In one respect, a continuation of the contractual relationship with the customer
is in direct conflict with Swiss Penal Code article 305 bis; but an abrupt severing
of relations with the customer could have the effect of preventing the confiscation
of the relevant assets. The client would be warned about the doubts concerning
him and consequently, would immediately withdraw his assets. The severing
95
could thus run counter to Swiss Penal Code article 305 bis.

90. Accord GRADER, supra note 12, at 202; du Pasquier & von Planta, supra note 22, at 396;
Schmid, in SAY, supra note 12, at 122; see supra part II.A.
91. See VoRENTwuR, supra note 12, at 42.
92. See CDB, supra note 56, at art. 9.
93. See Basle Statement, supra note 5.
94. See Circular Letter as of December 18, 1991, effective May 1, 1992.
95. See also VoanrEwuRu, supra note 12, at 42-43; du Pasquier & von Planta, supra note 22,
at 396.
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2. Freezing of the Assets
To prevent the withdrawal of assets one may consider freezing the customer's
assets at the moment of knowledge, that is, at the moment the representative or
employee of the institution knows or should have known of the criminal origin
of the assets. Such blocking of funds, however, is likely to be a direct breach of
the customer's contract.
3. Denunciationof the Customer
Freezing of assets complies with the contractual obligations towards the customer only if a competent authority orders the freeze. An authority will order the
freeze only if it receives information about a possible criminal origin of the
assets. However, the delivery of such information will normally be a breach of
banking secrecy 96 protected by penal law. 9 7 With regard to institutions or persons
engaged in the financial sector other than banks, a violation of the business or
manufacturing secrecy, protected by Swiss Penal Code article 162, perhaps may
be considered. Also, professional secrecy such as provided for attorneys at law,
notaries, and the like, protected by Swiss Penal Code article 312, might be
infringed. However, banking secrecy is emphasized because of its practical
importance in the financial business. Thus, the following discussion focuses on
banking secrecy only.
V. Banking Secrecy
The new money laundering provisions do not destroy traditional Swiss banking secrecy. Article 47 of the BaG still protects banking secrecy in its whole
scope, and an unlawful breach of it is still treated as a crime. The banking
secrecy law is an expression of the importance given to the protection of the
individual's private sphere. Consequently, a denunciation of a customer by a
bank or bank-like institution is still in direct conflict with the banking secrecy
principle.
However, the banking secrecy rules have never been absolute; the preexisting
general restrictions on banking secrecy remain. The officers, employees, and
representatives of a bank, therefore, are required to give evidence and information to domestic authorities in criminal and bankruptcy proceedings or in connection with tax fraud, and to foreign authorities if the Swiss Confederation has
granted judicial assistance. Judicial assistance will be granted provided the conditions of Swiss laws are met. The offenses on which the foreign proceedings are
based must be defined as crimes under both laws, 98 that is, the laws of the
requesting state and those of Switzerland. Pursuant to the Treaty on Mutual

96. See BaG art. 47.

97. StGB art. 312.
98. With respect to Switzerland, see supra part ll.B.
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Assistance in Criminal Matters between the United States and Switzerland,
banking secrecy can be lifted even in cases of simple tax evasion if it is in
connection with organized crime. 99 Furthermore, banks are obliged to provide
information to persons such as guardians, administrators, executors of wills, and
parents, as well as to any federal or cantonal court or agency, in the same way
as any other citizen must testify. However, banking secrecy is also protected in
such cases if a special provision preserves it, which is rarely the case, or if the
court issues a specific order. Due to the new provisions supplementing the Swiss
Penal Code, a reasonable suspicion with respect to money laundering activities
and the identity of the beneficial owner can give rise to criminal proceedings and
so lift the banking secrecy.
A bank suspecting an illegal origin of assets that informs a competent criminal
prosecution authority without a request from such authority risks infringing
banking secrecy. Existing defenses under the Swiss Penal Code appear inapplicable; there exists neither any official or professional duty of notification, nor is
it a self-defense situation, nor any emergency, because such defenses target only
the protection of individual interests and not the interest of criminal prosecution.
Also, other defenses, such as the excuse of a collision of legal duties or the right
to enforce lawful interests, are unlikely to apply. 1oo
However, one might argue that Swiss Federal Law on Banks and Savings
Banks article 47 allows for notification to the Swiss Federal Banking Commission since it is the supervisory authority created by the Swiss Federal Law 10on1
Banks and Savings Banks to enforce law and order in the banking business.
The Swiss Federal Banking Commission would then have to decide whether or
not to inform the competent criminal prosecution authorities of the facts so
notified. Consequently, it would not be the bank, but the Swiss Federal Banking
Commission that notifies, and the bank would freeze the assets not upon its own
request, but upon the request of the Swiss Federal Banking Commission. When
the respective criminal prosecution authority decides to initiate criminal proceedings, the bank would again have to comply with regular legal obligations to
provide evidence and information upon request of such authority.
Although the above is a possible solution to the dilemma under the present laws,
it nonetheless conflicts with the spirit of the banking secrecy principle. And, as
mentioned, lawful defenses are unlikely to apply. The most practical solution
would be to amend Swiss banking secrecy law. Under such an amended law
anyone reporting truly suspicious financial transactions to a competent authority
would not be charged with a breach of banking secrecy. Indeed, the Swiss Ministry
of Justice recently proposed legislation aimed at this purpose. The proposal is
expected to be presented to the Swiss Federal Parliament in the near future.
99. Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Between the United States and Switzerland, May 25, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 2019, 12 I.L.M. 916.
100. See also VoRrwuR, supra note 12, at 43-44.
101. Cf., e.g., du Pasquier & von Planta, supra note 22, at 396.
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The proposed amendment to Swiss Penal Code article 305 ter would introduce
the right of a person professionally engaged in the financial business to notify the
competent authorities of observations giving rise to suspicions that certain assets
result from crime. 10 2 Thus, there is still no duty to notify, but the right to do so
would create a valid defense concerning breach of professional secrecy, and in
particular, banking secrecy.
The right to notify is designed to affect the very same persons toward whom
Swiss Penal Code article 305 ter is focused. 10 3 Relevant observations must
somehow cause a suspicion. Suspicion is considered sufficient if it has reached
a degree normally required for initiating criminal proceedings. As a rule of
thumb, a person professionally engaged in the financial business is entitled to
notify a criminal prosecution authority if he has reason to assume that the authority would have requested him to provide such information. 104
It is understood that only Swiss criminal prosecution authorities would receive
notification; there would not be a right to notify tax, custom or foreign author10 5
ities. Finally, a lawful notification would not depend on formal requirements.
VI. Conclusion
Generally, Swiss jurisdiction applies to offenses perpetrated in the territory of
Switzerland only. However, pursuant to a special provision, money laundering
activities are punishable under Swiss law even if the prior offense has been
committed abroad.
The statutory definition of money laundering comprises any acts or omissions
that are designed in a concrete or abstract sense to prevent the discovery and
confiscation of the proceeds of a crime as well as the investigation regarding the
origin of assets. A person involved in money laundering may be punished only
if he knows or assumes that the assets result from crime; negligence, even gross
negligence, is not considered an offense.
This basic statutory definition of money laundering is joined by a provision
that has an even greater impact on an institution engaged in the financial sector:
any person who professionally deals with funds and other financial assets and
who fails to ascertain the identity of the actual beneficial owner is susceptible to
prosecution. Professionals have to establish with all due diligence the identity of
the beneficiary. Because the line is still unclear on how far financial institutions
have to go in determining such identity, the Swiss Federal Banking Commission
has recently established closer guidelines that provide a helpful tool for making
banks and bank-like institutions deal sensibly with the new provision.

102. See VoRENTwuRF, supra note 12, at 44. The definitions of "assets" and "crime" correspond
with the definitions already used in StGB art. 305 ter. See supra part II.B.
103. See supra part III.A.
104. See VoRitNTwuRt, supra note 12, at 45-46.
105. See id. at 46.
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Under Swiss law the entity is not punishable, but its representatives or employees who act on behalf of such entity are subject to punishment. The Swiss
Ministry of Justice has recently proposed a draft law that also establishes the
criminal liability of entities.
If the identification of the beneficial owner indicates illegal origin of the assets
or if it becomes known that the customer is using financial services in a way that
indicates a criminal origin of the assets, an institution engaged in financial
business is well advised to refrain from executing any transaction; otherwise it
risks that such transaction would be considered money laundering. The situation
creates serious conflicts for the institution concerned. A guideline in that respect
has not yet been provided by a court.
The Swiss rules of banking secrecy are not lifted by the new money laundering
provisions; the preexisting general limits to the banking secrecy rules remain the
same. Due to the new provisions supplementing the Swiss Penal Code, however,
criminal proceedings with respect to money laundering activities and lack of due
diligence can now also be brought upon reasonable suspicion. Furthermore,
under the present law a degree of uncertainty remains about whether a criminal
complaint by a bank or bank-like institution against one of its clients would
compromise banking secrecy if there are good reasons to suspect illegal origin of
the assets. Therefore, legislation is proposed under which anyone reporting
suspicious financial transactions could no longer be charged with a breach of
banking secrecy. Supporting legislation and clarifying caselaw is expected to
follow.
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